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THE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT IN CALIFORNIA
Entrapment has been defined as "the conception and planning of
an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by
one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery,
persuasion, or fraud of the officer."'. The word "officer" in this
definition includes police officers, law enforcement agents, and pri-
vate citizens working with the police as informers.2 Entrapment is
an affirmative or positive defense to a criminal charge.3  The essen-
tial elements of the defense are a lack of criminal intent on the
part of the accused prior to his contact with the police officer or in-
former,4 and persuasion, inducement, or allurement on the part of
the officer 5 resulting in a criminal act which otherwise would not
have been committed.6
There are two general situations in which those accused of a
crime have successfully asserted the defense of entrapment. In
one type of situation proof of entrapping methods has negated an
essential element of the crime. An example of this situation is
where, in a prosecution for violation of a theft statute, the evidence
shows that the owner of the property actively participated in
delivering it to the defendant and therefore is found to have con-
sented to the property being taken.7 Since lack of consent on the
part of the property owner is an essential element of this type of
crime,s entrapment is successful as a defense because the prosecutor
fails to sustain his burden of proving the defendant guilty of the
crime.9 In the second type of situation the defense of entrapment is
asserted when the defendant has been induced to commit the crime by
1 Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454 (1932); People v. Lindsey,
91 Cal. App. 2d 914, 916, 205 P.2d 1114, 1115 (1949).
2 See, e.g., People v. Perez, 62 Cal. 2d 769, 775, 401 P.2d 934, 937 (1965).
An informer must have entered into the cooperative plan with the police,
thus in a sense becoming an agent for them, prior to his alleged entrapment of
the defendant. See Note, Entrapment, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1333, 1340-41 (1960).
But see In re Moore, 70 Cal. App. 483, 488, 233 P. 805, 807 (1924) (dictum),
where entrapment was considered an issue although the alleged entrappers
were "investigators" for the Anti-Saloon League who had no previous ar-
rangement with the police.
8 E.g., People v. Adams, 213 Cal. App. 2d 537, 540, 29 Cal. Rptr. 57, 59
(1963) (affirmative); People v. D'Agostino, 190 Cal. App. 2d 447, 461, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 847, 856 (1961) (positive).
4 See, e.g., People v. Rivers, 188 Cal. App. 2d 189, 192, 10 Cal. Rptr.
309, 311-12 (1961); People v. Grosofsky, 73 Cal. App. 2d 15, 18, 165 P.2d 757,
759 (1946).
5 See, e.g., People v. Lagomarsino, 97 Cal. App. 2d 92, 96, 217 P.2d 124,
127 (1950), quoting People v. Lindsey, 91 Cal. App. 2d 914, 917, 205 P.2d 1114,
1115 (1949).
6 E.g., People v. Evans, 134 Cal. App. 2d 733, 736, 286 P.2d 368, 369 (1955).
7 E.g., People v. Werner, 16 Cal. 2d 216, 224, 105 P.2d 927, 932 (1940).
8 People v. Cannon, 77 Cal. App. 2d 678, 692, 176 P.2d 409, 417 (1947).
9 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1096 requires that the prosecutor prove the defendant
in a criminal action guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, or the defendant is
entitled to an acquittal.
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an undercover police officer or an informer working in cooperation
with the police, but none of the essential elements of the crime is
negated. It is this type of entrapment that is the concern of this
comment.
A good example of the second type of situation is found in
Sherman v. United States.10 In that case a government informer
met the defendant at a doctor's office where both men were being
treated for narcotics addiction. After cultivating the defendant's
friendship during subsequent meetings at the doctor's office, the in-
former told the defendant that he was failing to respond to treat-
ment and asked the defendant if he knew a good source where he
could obtain narcotics for the informer's own use. Following the
defendant's refusal to help, the informer repeatedly made similar re-
quests, coupled with appeals to sympathy and friendship, until the
defendant finally acquiesced. The defendant thereafter made a num-
ber of small purchases from which he sold half to the informer, each
sale being observed by informed agents of the Bureau of Narcotics.
The United States Supreme Court held that the evidence showed
entrapment had taken place as a matter of law."
In California, as in most other jurisdictions, entrapment is not a
statutory defense. It has been created and developed solely by the
courts. It is the purpose of this comment to define and analyze the
doctrine of entrapment as it has developed in California; to point out
some of the apparent confusion in regard to the legal basis of the
defense and the rules which should logically follow from this basis;
and to suggest changes in the doctrine which would help alleviate
the confusion.
For two reasons emphasis will be placed upon the use of the
defense of entrapment in narcotics cases. First, the peculiar nature
of narcotics offenses 12 and the problems they present to effective
law enforcement necessarily lead to the use of trapping methods by
police. Violations of narcotics laws are of a secret and consensual
nature,'13 and detection is nearly impossible without some form of
police participation and inducement. Second, section 11106 of the
California Health and Safety Code provides for state reimbursement
of sums expended by officers of the Division of Narcotic Enforce-
ment in purchasing drugs for evidence and in the employment of
"operators" to obtain evidence. Both the nature of narcotics offenses
and section 11106 of the Code undoubtedly contribute to the fact
that the defense of entrapment is asserted more frequently in nar-
cotics cases than in any other type of criminal case.14
10 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
11 Id. at 373.
12 For the California narcotics offenses see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 11500-57.
13 See generally Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool
Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1113 (1951); 8 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 463, 465 (1961).
14 A survey conducted by the authors of this comment reveals that 18
cases involving a claim of entrapment were appealed in California during the
years 1965-1966. The criminal charge in 14 of these 18 cases involved viola-
tions of narcotics statutes.
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Legal Justification for the Doctrine
Entrapment did not exist as a defense at common law, and the
American courts only began to develop the doctrine in the late 19th
century.15 No California case has been found before the 20th cen-
tury where entrapment was discussed other than cases where the
defense negated an essential element of the crime. 16 In cases prior
to the 20th century, however, defendants attempted to make use of
police participation in the crime to secure acquittal in another way.
When the only evidence produced against the defendant was the
testimony of the participating officer or informer, the claim was
asserted that the officer's participation made him an accomplice and,
therefore, a conviction based solely on his uncorroborated testimony
would violate the California rule requiring corroboration of accom-
plice testimony.1'7 As a result, California courts adopted the "feigned
accomplice" rule, which provided that the testimony of one who
feigned cooperation with a person in his criminal design in order to
secure evidence did not require corroboration. 8
In 1905 a California appellate court indicated that there was a
"rule against encouraging crime, merely to procure its commission,
to the end that those willing to become offenders may be punished."' 9
This statement was apparently a recognition of the entrapment doc-
trine which was developing in the courts of other jurisdictions. 20 In
the 1915 case of Woo Wai v. United States2' entrapment became a part
of the federal law when the Ninth Circuit Court reversed a conviction
on the ground that persuasion or allurement into the commission
of crime by government officers was a valid defense to a criminal
charge.22 This influential case probably resulted in a greater recog-
nition of the defense by the California courts and in an effort to define
it in a more detailed manner.23
15 See Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U.
PA. L. Ruv. 245, 245-46 (1942).
16 An example of a California case where entrapment was treated as
negating an essential element of a crime is People v. Collins, 53 Cal. 185 (1878).
17 See, e.g., People v. Farrell, 30 Cal. 316, 317 (1866). CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 1111 sets out the rule requiring that accomplice testimony be corroborated.
18 E.g., People v. Farrell, 30 Cal. 316, 317 (1866).
19 People v. Bunkers, 2 Cal. App. 197, 209, 84 P. 364, 370 (1905) (dictum).
20 See, e.g., United States v. Whittier, 28 F. Cas. 591 (No. 16,688) (C.C.E.D.
Mo. 1878) (dictum); Ford v. City of Denver, 10 Colo. App. 500, 51 P. 1015
(1898).
21 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
22 Id. at 415.
23 There appears to have been at least one other influencing factor caus-
ing increased recognition of the defense of entrapment by California courts.
In 1918 the legal encyclopedia Corpus Juris listed entrapment as a defense to
a criminal charge and traced its development in the American courts to that
time. C.J. Criminal Law § 57 (1918). The very next year a California appel-
late court, while discussing the doctrine, gave particular emphasis to what
had been said in Corpus Juris. People v. Macy, 43 Cal. App. 479, 482, 184 P.
1008, 1009-10 (1919). Also, it is possible that the passage of the National Pro-
hibition Act (Act of Oct. 28, 1919), ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305, and the Wright Act,
Cal. Stats. 1921, ch. 80, at 79, its California equivalent, violations of which
involved the same secret and consensual acts as narcotic offenses, increased
the number of cases involving police solicitation of crime and resulting claims
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Following the lead of Woo Wai, a California appellate court in
1918 concluded that to convict a person who had no intent to com-
mit the crime prior to his contact with a police officer or informer,
and who had been inveigled into its commission by such a person,
would be "repugnant to any just conception of good morals and viola-
tive of sound public policy. '24 But the court, and other California
courts which repeated the reasoning,25 failed to be more specific and
explain the legal justification for this public policy. The question
of legal justification was not dealt with in California until after
the federal courts had faced the problem in 1932 in Sorrefls v.
United States.26
In Sorrells a divided Supreme Court espoused conflicting views
on the legal justification for the defense of entrapment. The ma-jority of the Court justified the defense on the theory that the acts
of a person who had been entrapped did not fall within the purview
of the statute under which he was being prosecuted, "because it can-
not be supposed that Congress intended that the letter of its enact-
ment should be used to support such a gross perversion of its pur-
pose. '27 In other words, according to the Court, when entrapment is
proven the defendant is acquitted because the law was not intended
to apply to him; that is, he has not committed a crime.
A minority of the justices concurred in the decision but did not
agree with the rationale of the majority. In the view of the minor-
ity, it was "unwarranted" to say that a crime had not been com-
mitted solely because the police had inveigled the accused into its
commission. 28  Entrapment, according to the minority, was not a
defense for the accused at all. It "attributes no merit to a guilty
defendant,"2 9 who, by "his act, coupled with his intent to do the act,
brings him within the definition of the law; he has no rights or
equities by reason of his entrapment. '30  Instead, in the minority
view entrapment was a defense for the courts to apply in order to
prevent the government from using methods of law enforcement
which amounted to a "prostitution of the criminal law,"3' and to
prevent the courts from being made an "instrument of wrong. 3 2
The legal justification for the defense was that it was necessary in
order for the courts to protect the "purity of government"33 as well
as the courts' own purity, a duty which was within their exclusive
province.3 4 Under the minority theory the defendant, though guilty
of entrapment. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932) (con-
curring opinion); cf. In re Moore, 70 Cal. App. 483, 484, 233 P. 805 (1924);
People v. Tomasovich, 56 Cal. App. 520, 523, 206 P. 119, 120 (1922).
24 People v. Barkdoll, 36 Cal. App. 25, 28, 171 P. 440, 441 (1918) (dictum).
25 E.g., People v. Norcross, 71 Cal. App. 2, 8, 234 P. 438, 440-41 (1925);
In re Moore, 70 Cal. App. 483, 487-88, 233 P. 805, 806-07 (1924).
26 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
27 Id. at 452.
28 Id. at 456.
29 Id. at 455.
30 Id. at 456.
31 Id. at 457.
82 Id. at 456.
33 Id. at 455.
34 Id. at 457.
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as charged, would be acquitted for the purpose of maintaining proper
standards of conduct in government and the courts.
In the 1954 case of People v. Jackson,35 the California Supreme
Court for the first time reached a conclusion on the question of the
legal justification for the defense of entrapment. The conclusion
was similar to that of the majority in Sorrells. In essence, a de-
fendant who had been entrapped was acquitted because under the
circumstances he had not committed a crime. The court explained
that
[u]nder the doctrine of entrapment, the overt acts essential to the
commission of the offense are assumed to have been committed by
the defendant. But the criminal intent, as here also essential to the
completion of the crime, is not assumed to have been established. It
is assumed to be lacking .... 36
The reasoning of the Jackson court resembled the theory that entrap-
ment is a successful defense if it negates an essential element of
the crime.3 7 While differing in form from the theory of the majority
in Sorrels, it reached the same result-a defendant who had been en-
trapped had committed no crime.
3 8
In 1958 the United States Supreme Court again dealt with the
legal justification for the doctrine of entrapment, 39 and the Court
split along the same lines as in Sorrells. The majority refused to
re-examine the theory espoused by the majority in Sorrells,40 while
the minority asserted that the justification for the defense was that
it deterred "impermissible police conduct."41  The power to estab-
lish a policy for regulating police conduct, the minority explained,
was based on the recognized jurisdiction of the courts to formulate
and apply proper standards for enforcement of the federal criminal
law in the federal courts, so long as Congress had not specifically
legislated to that end.
42
With this renewed conflict of views among the United States
Supreme Court Justices in the background, the issue again came
before the California Supreme Court in the 1959 case of People v.
Benford.43 This time the court discarded its stand in Jackson,44 and
adopted the reasoning of the concurring justices in Sorrells and Sher-
man. The court maintained that the only justification for the de-
fense is "out of regard for its [the court's] own dignity, and in the
exercise of its power and the performance of its duty to formulate
and apply proper standards for judicial enforcement of the criminal
law . . . . 45 The defense affords no merit to the guilty defendant
35 42 Cal. 2d 540, 268 P.2d 6 (1954).
36 Id. at 547, 268 P.2d at 11 (dictum).
37 See text accompanying notes 6-9 supra.
38 The theory that a person who had been entrapped had committed no
crime had been recognized as the California law prior to Jackson. In 1946 the
editors of CALJIC had included it in the recommended jury instructions on
the defense of entrapment. CALJIC Instruction No. 851 (1946).
39 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
40 Id. at 378-79 (concurring opinion).
41 Id. at 385 (concurring opinion).
42 Id. at 380-81.
43 53 Cal. 2d 1, 345 P.2d 928 (1959).
44 People v. Jackson, 42 Cal. 2d 540, 268 P.2d 6 (1954).
45 People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 9, 345 P.2d 928, 933 (1959).
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who is "just as guilty where his seducer is a police officer as he
would be if he were persuaded by a hardened criminal accomplice. ' '46
Thus in Benford the court established that the legal justification for
the defense of entrapment in California is that it provides the courts
with a means of carrying out their duty of setting proper standards
of law enforcement. It has nothing to do with the innocence of the
defendant, who is no less culpable because of his entrapment. This
view has been followed in subsequent California cases.47
Evaluation of the Legal Justification
There are a number of arguments which may be used to point
out the weaknesses of the "police conduct" theory of entrapment
formulated by the concurring justices in Sorrells and Sherman and
adopted by California in Benford. First, it has been suggested that
the reasoning of the theory is circular, and ultimately must be re-
duced to a conclusion that the defendant's guilt is diminished.4 8  It
is difficult to dispute the soundness of this suggestion. The sup-
porters of the "police conduct" theory reason that the court must
turn its back against the prosecution of a person who has been en-
trapped because public policy requires that they discourage "im-
permissible police conduct."49  But why is the police conduct im-
permissible?
Before an answer to this question is proposed, it should be
noted that the courts which use the "police conduct" theory have
acknowledged that police "may lawfully descend to the depths of
deceit and trickery"50 in order to apprehend those engaged in the
commission of crime.51 These courts distinguish between "the trap
for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal ' 52
because only the former is held to be entrapment. 53 The latter is a
permissible method of law enforcement. 54 Such statements make it
clear that the supporters of the "police conduct" theory do not
believe that the conduct is impermissible merely because it is fraud-
ulent, deceitful, and amounts to a trap. Hence, the impermissibility
of the police conduct does not lie in the nature of the methods
employed,55 but in the type of person apprehended by the use of the
46 Id. at 9, 345 P.2d at 934.
47 See, e.g., People v. Valverde, 246 Cal. App. 2d 318, 322-24, 54 Cal. Rptr.
528, 531-32 (1966); People v. Chavez, 184 Cal. App. 2d 741, 744, 7 Cal. Rptr.
729, 731 (1960). But see People v. Monteverde, 236 Cal. App. 2d 630, 639, 46
Cal. Rptr. 206, 213 (1965), quoting from People v. Jackson, 42 Cal. 2d 540,
547, 268 P.2d 6, 13 (1954).
48 Note, Entrapment, 73 HARV. L. Rv. 1333 (1960).
49 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 385 (1958) (concurring opin-
ion).
50 People v. Ollado, 246 Cal. App. 2d 608, 615, 55 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126 (1966).
51 See, e.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453-54 (1932) (con-
curring opinion).
52 People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 10-11, 345 P.2d 928, 934 (1959), quot-
ing from Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958); People v. D'Agos-
tino, 190 Cal. App. 2d 447, 462, 11 Cal. Rptr. 847, 856 (1961).
53 Id.
54 See text accompanying note 50 supra.
55 "The law does not concern itself with the morality or ethics of such
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methods. The answer, according to the apparent logic of the theory
itself, is that the police conduct is impermissible only because it
leads to the arrest and conviction of persons who are not sufficiently
blameworthy to merit punishment.56
In spite of the position of the "police conduct" theory that the
defense of entrapment does not relieve the defendant's guilt, it is
interesting that California courts after Benford seem to recognize
the defense when they feel that the defendant is not sufficiently
culpable to merit punishment. Illustrative of this point are People
v. Goree57 and People v. Ollado.58 Both cases involved charges of
selling or furnishing a narcotic.59 No greater amount of police per-
suasion appears to have taken place in one case than in the other.60
Yet in Goree the appellate court found that the evidence was such
that a jury could reasonably conclude that while the defendant was
a "user," he was not a "pusher," and his furnishing marijuana to the
officer was an isolated act not intended or designed by him until
trickery. Upon the contrary, it encourages and deems to be admirable the
use by law enforcement agencies of methods in the apprehension of offenders
which in the minds of all just men are considered dishonorable and abhor-
rent." Whitlow v. Board of Medical Examiners, 248 A.C.A. 595, 608, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 525, 534 (1967).
56 At present there is little authority for the proposition that police
methods which induce crime are impermissible because they violate the de-
fendant's constitutional rights. Only one federal court has stated that a con-
viction procured by entrapment violates the defendant's rights to due process
of law. Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 1957) (dictum).
No California court has so stated. For a discussion of this point, see Com-
ment, The Entrapment Doctrine in the Federal Courts, and Some State Court
Comparisons, 49 J. CRnm. L.C. & P.S. 447, 449 (1959).
57 240 Cal. App. 2d 304, 49 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1966).
58 246 Cal. App. 2d 608, 55 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1966).
59 Id. at 609-10, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 122-23; People v. Goree, 240 Cal. App. 2d
304, 305-06, 49 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1966).
60 The evidence discussed by the appellate courts indicates the following
degrees of inducement: In Goree, an officer on an undercover assignment
played a game of pool with the defendant whom he apparently did not suspect
of any criminal activity. When the officer asked the defendant to play another
game, the defendant declined because he said he only had 50 cents and needed
it for a "thing" (a marijuana cigarette). The officer then asked the defend-
ant if he could get him "one of those things." The defendant asked: "You're
not police are you?" The officer answered: "No, man you know better than
that. I am not the man." The defendant then took $3 from the officer, left
for 15 minutes and returned with six marijuana cigarettes. He once again
expressed the hope that the officer was not a policeman, after which he gave
the cigarette to the officer. Id. at 306-07, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 393-94.
In Ollado, an officer and an informer whom the defendant had known for
seven years and knew to be a narcotic addict went to the defendant's home.
The informer told the defendant that he and the officer were "sick," meaning
that they were suffering withdrawal symptoms and were greatly in need of
heroin to relieve their distress, and asked the defendant to sell them some
heroin. The officer then conversed with the defendant about the price, which
was set at $75. The defendant took the money and left for about 30 minutes,
returning with the heroin in a green balloon inside his mouth. He handed
the balloon to the officer, and before they left he informed them not to return
unless they wanted to buy at least a quarter-ounce of heroin. People v.
Ollado, 246 Cal. App. 2d 608, 609-10, 55 Cal. Rptr. 122, 122-23 (1966).
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suggested by the officer.0 1 If this conclusion were reached, then
the defendant, although certainly guilty of the crime of possession of
marijuana,62 would not be blameworthy enough to be punished for
the more serious offense of selling or furnishing marijuana. 3 Hence,
the appellate court held that an instruction on entrapment should
have been given . 4 On the other hand, the evidence in Ollado indi-
cated that the defendant was already deeply involved in the illicit
heroin traffic, and therefore he could not reasonably be deemed to
be less culpable because he had been tricked by the police on a par-
ticular occasion. In this case the appellate court held that the de-
fendant had received a fair trial although he was not allowed to de-
velop his case on entrapment.65 The Goree and Olado courts appear
to be making entrapment available to persons who lack sufficient
culpability to merit punishment, and denying the defense to persons
who are sufficiently blameworthy despite the methods used to appre-
hend them.
As noted earlier, under the "police conduct" theory the entrapped
defendant is guilty of the crime charged, but is acquitted in order to
establish proper standards for enforcement of the criminal law.
This method of setting proper police standards through acquittal is
an additional weakness of the "police conduct" theory. Courts in
various jurisdictions have carried out the duty of setting standards
for law enforcement by establishing rules on matters such as illegal
search and seizure66 and confessions obtained during an illegal de-
tention,67 but these rules have been based on the traditional power
of the courts over the admission and exclusion of evidence,6 8 and
61 People v. Goree, 240 Cal. App. 2d 304, 310, 49 Cal. Rptr. 392, 395 (1966).
62 The defendant intended to buy a "thing" for himself anyway, so it
cannot be said that the officer entrapped him into possessing marijuana. See
note 60 supra.
63 Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoD § 11530, where possession of
marijuana is made punishable by imprisonment "for not less than one year
nor more than 10 years," with CAL. HELuT & SAFETY CoDE § 11531, where
selling or furnishing marijuana is made punishable by imprisonment "from
five years to life." There is a possibility of parole in the former after 1 year,
while in the latter parole is not possible until after 3 years.
04 People v. Goree, 240 Cal. App. 2d 304, 312, 49 Cal. Rptr. 392, 396
(1966).
65 People v. Ollado, 246 Cal. App. 2d 608, 615, 55 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126
(1966).
66 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Illegal search
and seizure is prohibited by the fourth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution. There is nothing in the Constitution, however, which expressly
prohibits the admission of evidence obtained by an unlawful search and seiz-
ure. Hence, the courts which voluntarily adopted an exclusionary rule as to
evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment, prior to the imposi-
tion of the exclusionary rule by the United States Supreme Court in Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), were setting standards for proper law enforce-
ment; that is, standards which would avoid violations of constitutional guar-
antees. E.g., id.; People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (1955).
These courts were not simply enforcing rules imposed upon them by the Con-
stitution.
67 See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
68 E.g., id. at 341; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). See
generally McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
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not on a power to free guilty defendants. The power to exclude
evidence has nothing to do with the ultimate question of the inno-
cence or guilt of the particular defendant. The courts which use the
"police conduct" theory are claiming a power to acquit defendants
who are guilty of the crime charged. But the majority opinion in
Sorrells points out that this amounts to judicial clemency, 69 and the
United States Supreme Court has recognized clemency as an ex-
ecutive function.70 Likewise in California the power of clemency is
vested only in the governor.71
The theory that the defense of entrapment rests upon dimin-
ished culpability is not totally immune from logical criticism. A
strong argument against it is that a person who has been induced to
commit a crime cannot be any less culpable because it was a police
officer or informer who made the inducement rather than an ordinary
citizen. 72 Nevertheless, it appears that in the final analysis the de-
fense of entrapment should be based on a social judgment that an
otherwise innocent person who has fallen prey 'to traps set by society
through its law enforcement officers, for the purpose of instigating
violations of its own rules, does not deserve to be punished.73 Hence,
it is proposed that it would be better for California courts to abandon
the reasoning of the "police conduct" theory, and hold that the
legal justification for the doctrine of entrapment is that the entrapped
person is not sufficiently culpable to be found "guilty" of the crime
charged.
Operation of the Doctrine in California
Since the appearance of the defense of entrapment in California
in the early 20th century, the courts have established a number of
rules to govern its operation. The most important of these rules
govern: (a) whether or not the defendant may assert the defense
while denying the crime; (b) the burden of proof required for the
defense; (c) the duties of the court and jury in determining ques-
tions of law and fact; (d) the point at which entrapment is an
appealable issue; and, (e) the test used to determine whether the
defendant was in fact entrapped. These rules and some problems
in their application are considered in the following discussion.
Entrapment as an Admission of Guilt
For many years California courts took the position that denial of
the criminal act was inconsistent with the defense of entrapment,7 4
because "the defense necessarily assumes that the act charged as a
public offense was comnitted."7 In practice this rule meant that
69 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 449 (1932).
70 Id., citing Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916).
71 CAL. CONST. art. VII, § 1; CAL. PEN. CODE § 4800.
72 See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (concurring
opinion, Frankfurter, J.).
73 See Note, Entrapment, 73 Ha~v. L. Rv. 1333, 1335 (1960).
74 E.g., People v. Wallace, 199 Cal. App. 2d 678, 681-82, 18 Cal. Rptr. 917,
918-19 (1962).
75 People v. Lee, 9 Cal. App. 2d 99, 109, 48 P.2d 1003, 1007 (1935).
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the defense was conditioned upon an admission by the defendant that
the criminal act was committed. Despite criticism of the rule in
various legal writings,7 6 it persisted until the 1965 California Su-
preme Court case of People v. Perez.7 7  In this case the court con-
cluded, "[a] rule [of entrapment] designed to deter such unlawful
[police] conduct cannot properly be restricted by compelling a de-
fendant to incriminate himself as a condition to invoking the rule.178
As a result of this decision, California courts now allow the defendant
to deny commission of the criminal act and still assert the defense
of entrapment. 79
Burden of Proof
As an affirmative defense, entrapment imposes on the defendant
the "burden of proving that he was induced to commit the crime of
which he is charged" 0 before it becomes an issue for the trier of
fact. The trial court has the duty to determine whether the de-
fendant has introduced enough evidence to meet this burden of proof;
in other words, the trial court determines whether entrapment is an
issue in the case to be considered by the trier of fact.81 Mere sus-
picion and conjecture as to the defendant's entrapment on the part of
his counsel is insufficient to make it an issue.8 2 Until recently Cal-
ifornia law was vague as to the precise quantum of evidence re-
quired of a defendant in order to raise the issue of entrapment.8 3
Was he required to introduce enough evidence, if believed, to prove
by a preponderance that he was entrapped, or was it sufficient
that he introduced enough evidence, if believed, to raise a reasonable
doubt as to the existence of entrapment? This question constitutes
an important problem facing the defendant during the presentation
of his case at the trial, and a direct answer was not given by a
California court until the 1966 case of People v. Valverde. 4 Since
76 Note, Entrapment, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1333, 1343 (1960); 30 S. CAL. L.
REv. 542, 544-45 (1957); Note, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1302, 1303 (1957).
77 62 Cal. 2d 769, 401 P.2d 938, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1965). See also People v.
West, 139 Cal. App. 2d 923, 293 P.2d 166 (Super. Ct. 1956).
78 People v. Perez, 62 Cal. 2d 769, 775, 401 P.2d 934, 938, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326,
330 (1965).
79 E.g., People v. Monteverde, 236 Cal. App. 2d 630, 640, 46 Cal. Rptr. 206,
214 (1965).
80 People v. Gutierrez, 128 Cal. App. 2d 387, 390, 275 P.2d 65, 66 (1954).
81 See, e.g., People v. Evans, 134 Cal. App. 2d 733, 736, 286 P.2d 368, 369-70
(1955).
82 People v. Outcault, 90 Cal. App. 2d 25, 32, 202 P.2d 602, 606 (1949).
83 Some courts have said that the defendant was entitled to an instruction
on the theory of his defense so long as there was "substantial" evidence sup-
porting it. E.g., PeopAe v. Bernal, 174 Cal. App. 2d 777, 783, 345 P.2d 140, 144
(1959) (not substantial); People v. Gallagher, 107 Cal. App. 425, 428, 290 P.
504, 505 (1930) (substantial). Other courts have used the term "sufficient"
evidence. People v. Marsden, 234 Cal. App. 2d 796, 799, 44 Cal. Rptr. 728, 730
(1965). A third approach of the courts would allow the instruction if there
was evidence "deserving of any consideration whatever." People v. Alamillo,
113 Cal. App. 2d 617, 620, 248 P.2d 421, 422 (1952). Clearly, the terms used
by the courts do not precisely define the quantum of evidence required to
satisfy the burden of showing entrapment.
84 246 Cal. App. 2d 318, 54 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1966).
[Vol. 19
ENTRAPMENT IN CALIFORNIA
this recent case has a new and significant effect on the defense of
entrapment, a detailed analysis of its holding is appropriate.
In Valverde, the court of appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial
court that the "defendant did not carry the burden of persuasion by a
preponderance of the evidence as to the existence of entrapment .7.1r,, In so holding, the appellate court attempted to establish that
proof by a preponderance of the evidence had always been the pre-
vailing California rule for the defense of entrapment. The court did
this by citing prior cases which held that the defendant had the
burden of showing entrapment 6 and that entrapment is an affirma-
tive defense.8 7 The court also drew support from certain legal
writers. 88 Yet the court concluded its discussion by stating that the
quantum of evidence needed for entrapment had never been previ-
85 Id. at 321, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
s6 Id. at 324-25, 54 Cal. Rptr. 532-33. The court begins with the lan-
guage "burden of showing," concludes that this is "burden of persuasion or the
burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence," then indicates that this
language is found in many cases. Id. at 325, 54 Cal. Rptr. 533. The cases the
court cites, however, do not refer to entrapment in terms of the required
quantum of evidence. They are: People v. Terry, 44 Cal. 2d 371, 372, 282
P.2d 19, 20 (1955); People v. Braddock, 41 Cal. 2d 794, 803, 264 P.2d 521, 526(1953); People v. Chavez, 184 Cal. App. 2d 741, 743, 7 Cal. Rptr. 729, 731
(1960); People v. Schwartz, 109 Cal. App. 2d 450, 455, 240 P.2d 1024, 1027(1952); People v. Grijalva, 48 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694, 121 P.2d 32, 34 (1941);
People v. Lee, 9 Cal. App. 2d 99, 109, 48 P.2d 1003, 1007 (1935). The term
"burden of showing" is used in these cases in the sense of "burden of proving."
The California courts seem to use the phrases "burden of proving" and "bur-
den of showing" interchangeably in entrapment cases. Compare People v.
Gutierrez, 128 Cal. App. 2d 387, 390, 275 P.2d 65, 66 (1954), citing People v.
Braddock, supra, with People v. Ray, 185 Cal. App. 2d 250, 254, 8 Cal. Rptr.
211, 213 (1960). It should be noted that this language, "burden of showing"
or "burden of proving," is not used only to describe a required quantum of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence. For example a defendant asserting
self-defense, that is, circumstances of justification, excuse, or mitigation, must
only raise a reasonable doubt, yet according to section 1105 of the Penal Code
he has the "burden of proving" self-defense. See note 100 and accompanying
text infra. Consequently, the reliance of the court on this type of language
to show a required quantum of proof by a preponderance is open to question.
87 People v. Valverde, 246 Cal. App. 2d 318, 325-26, 54 Cal. Rptr. 528, 533
(1966). The court cited the following cases indicating entrapment is an
affirmative defense: People v. Harris, 213 Cal. App. 2d 365, 368, 28 Cal. Rptr.
766, 768 (1963); People v. Hawkins, 210 Cal. App. 2d 669, 671, 27 Cal. Rptr.
144, 146 (1963); People v. Head, 208 Cal. App. 2d 360, 365, 25 Cal. Rptr. 124,
128 (1962); People v. Castro, 167 Cal. App. 2d 332, 337, 334 P.2d 602, 605 (1959);
People v. Gutierrez, 128 Cal. App. 2d 387, 390, 275 P.2d 65, 66 (1954). The
word "affirmative" is not considered to have a specific meaning, so the court's
reliance on this word to infer preponderance would not seem to be well-
founded. See discussion of the use of the word "affirmative" at note 90
infra and accompanying text.
88 People v. Valverde, 246 Cal. App. 2d 318, 324, 54 Cal. Rptr. 528, 532
(1966). The court referred to 1 B. WiTmw, CALIFORNIA CRIMES § 178 (1963) and
Note, Entrapment, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1344-45 (1960), for support from legal
writers who maintain that entrapment requires proof by a preponderance of
the evidence. But see the writers listed in note 107 infra who feel the de-
fendant's burden of proving entrapment requires that he only raise a reason-
able doubt as to the defense.
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ously decided:
We find no case that expressly states the defendant has the burden
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, but the repeated state-
ments referring to an affirmative defense indicate that this is the
fair inference to be drawn from the language in many cases.89
It is difficult to understand how the court could find that the
repetition of the phrase "affirmative defense" in the cited cases cre-
ated the inference of a requirement of a preponderance of evidence
in entrapment cases since "the 'affirmative of the issue' lacks any
substantial objective meaning ..... - In attempting to find a pre-
vailing rule in the case law for the quantum of evidence required
for entrapment, the court failed to recognize that, in fact, the pre-
ceding California cases were inconclusive on the issue of quantum of
evidence.9 1 Regardless of the effort of the court to show a pre-
vailing rule, the real basis of the decision is the doctrine of Benford
that entrapment does not go to the question of guilt.
92
The defendant in Valverde admitted making two sales of heroin
to a police informer, but he felt that he had been entrapped by ab-
normal persuasion and inducement.9 3 He maintained that his bur-
den "to prove entrapment was only to introduce sufficient evidence
to raise a reasonable doubt"94 as to the existence of entrapment.95 The
defendant felt that when the evidence of entrapment raised a rea-
sonable doubt, there was a reasonable doubt as to the question of
guilt, and therefore the prosecution would fail to meet the quantum of
proof imposed on it by section 1096 of the Penal Code. Section
89 People v. Valverde, 246 Cal. App. 2d 318, 325, 54 Cal. Rptr. 528, 533
(1966).
90 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 500, Law Revision Comm'n Comment. Section
500 says "a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or non-
existence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is
asserting." This section supersedes former Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1869
and 1981. These sections referred to the allocation of the burden of proof in
terms of issues which were "affirmative." The word "affirmative" was criti-
cized as meaningless and a play on words. CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 500, Law
Revision Comm'n Comment. It was deleted in section 500. The comment
points out that a criminal defense which comes under this section (and would
have come under the earlier sections as an "affirmative" defense) may only
require that it be proved by a reasonable doubt. Id. Thus the word "af-
firmative" gives no authority or indication that the quantum of evidence
required to be raised by a defendant for entrapment is a preponderance. The
quantum of evidence depends on whether the defense goes to the question
of guilt. See People v. McGill, 10 Cal. App. 2d 155, 160, 51 P.2d 433, 435 (1935).
91 See note 83, supra.
92 People v. Valverde, 246 Cal. App. 2d 318, 322-24, 54 Cal. Rptr. 528,
531-32 (1966).
93 "[The defendant] said Munoz [the informer] pleaded with him, saying
he was sick. Being an ex-addict, [the defendant] knew what withdrawal
symptoms were like and was sympathetic to Munoz." Id. at 320, 54 Cal. Rptr.
529-30.
94 Id. at 321, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
95 The defendant claimed he had the "burden of producing evidence"
rather than the "burden of persuasion." Id. The "burden of producing evi-
dence" argued by the defendant is "the obligation of a party to introduce evi-
dence sufficient to avoid a ruling against him on the issue." CAL. EVIDENCE
CODE § 110. See generally C. McCoRmIIcK, EVIDENCE § 306 (1954).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [VOL 19
1096 requires the state to prove the defendant guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt:9 6
A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the
contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his
guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal, but the
effect of this presumption is only to place upon the state the burden
of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
If entrapment goes to the guilt or innocence of the accused,
section 501 of the Evidence Code seems to give validity to the de-
fendant's position that he need only raise a reasonable doubt as to
the existence of entrapment. This section states that "[i]nsofar as
any statute . . . assigns the burden of proof in a criminal action,
such statute is subject to Penal Code Section 1096." It applies to
statutory defenses which relate to the defendant's guilt 97 as opposed
to statutory defenses which do not relate to guilt.9 8
Entrapment is not a statutory defense. However, self-defense, a
statutory defense,99 seems sufficiently analogous to entrapment to
make section 501 persuasive in support of the defendant's position.
Section 1105 of the Penal Code allocates to the defendant the "bur-
den of proving" self-defense.100 "Burden of proving" is the same
phrase that is used in many of the entrapment cases to indicate the
burden which the defendant must meet to show that he was induced
to commit the crime with which he is charged.' 0 ' If self-defense is
established, no crime has been committed;10 2 if the defense fails, the
defendant is found guilty. 03 Entrapment follows a similar proce-
dure; the decision on the issue leads to an acquittal or conviction. 0 4
Thus, self-defense and entrapment are both defenses which the de-
fendant has the "burden of proving," and each leads either to an
96 People v. Valverde, 246 Cal. App. 2d 318, 322, 54 Cal. Rptr. 528, 530
(1966).
97 The comment to section 501 of the Evidence Code explains that "where
a statute allocates the burden of proof to the defendant on any other issue
(than insanity] relating to the defendant's guilt, the defendant's burden, as
under existing law, is merely to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt."
98 See CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1016, 1020 for defenses which are not raised by
a plea of not guilty.
99 Certain statutes refer to what is commonly called self-defense. E.g.,
CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 197, 198 (justifiable homicide), §§ 692, 693 (right to make
lawful resistance).
100 "Upon a trial for murder, the commission of the homicide by the de-
fendant being proved, the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation, or
that justify or excuse it [that is, self-defense], devolves upon him .... .
CAL. PEN. CODE § 1105.
101 E.g., People v. Barone, 250 A.C.A. 883, 889, 58 Cal. Rptr. 783, 787 (1967);
People v. Adams, 213 Cal. App. 2d 536, 540, 29 Cal. Rptr. 57, 59 (1963).
102 See, e.g., People v. Toledo, 85 Cal. App. 2d 577, 193 P.2d 953 (1948);
People v. Anderson, 57 Cal. App. 721, 208 P. 204 (1922). See generally R.
PsamcNs, CRmMn-AL LAw 883-909 (1957).
103 See People v. Furber, 233 Cal. App. 2d 678, 43 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1965).
104 See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373 (1958), where the
Court reversed the conviction as a result of finding entrapment as a matter
of law. Cf. People v. Sweeney, 55 Cal. 2d 27, 357 P.2d 1049, 9 Cal. Rptr. 793
(1960), where the majority of the court held that there was no entrapment
as a matter of law and sustained the conviction, while the dissent maintained
that the conviction should be reversed because the defendant had been en-
trapped. Id. at 51, 53, 357 P.2d at 1063, 1064, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 807, 808.
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acquittal or a conviction. In cases where self-defense is asserted the
courts hold that the defendant has fulfilled the "burden of proving"
when he raises a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the defense.10 5
The defendant's contention in Valverde that he only had to raise the
issue of entrapment by a reasonable doubt, though never previously
considered, would seem tenable under this analysis. The position is
not without support. A federal case' 06 and several writers' 7 have
agreed with it.
The court in Valverde rejected the premise upon which the de-
fendant's position depended-that is, that entrapment went to the
question of guilt.'08 The court was following the theory of Ben-
ford."' 9 Since under the theory of that case entrapment does not
go to the question of guilt, the court reasoned, and was justified in
concluding, that the defendant's burden was to prove the existence
of entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence. 110 In criminal
cases issues which do not go to the defendant's guilt are traditionally
proved by a preponderance of the evidence."'. For example, terri-
torial jurisdiction, 112 venue,113 and the defendant's absence from the
105 See, e.g., People v. Mohammed, 189 Cal. 429, 208 P. 963 (1922); People
v. Ranson, 119 Cal. App. 2d 380, 259 P.2d 910 (1953).
106 See United States v. Silva, 180 F. Supp. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), where the
court said the defendant only had the burden of producing evidence as to
entrapment and the prosecution had to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 559.
107 Note, Entrapment: An Analysis of Disagreement, 45 B.U.L. REV. 542,
559-60 (1965) (prosecution must show beyond a reasonable doubt that induce-
ment was not entrapment); Note, The Law of Entrapment in Narcotics Arrests,
38 NoTRE DrovE LAW. 741, 745 (1963) (prosecution must show beyond a reason-
able doubt that government activities are not entrapment); 45 TEx. L. REV.
578, 581 (1967), where the writer says "the trend is to require the prosecution
to meet the traditional criminal standard of 'beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
See Orfield, Burden of Proof and Presumptions in Federal Criminal Cases, 31
U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 30, 48-49 (1963); B. WiTNmI, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE §§ 205,
212 (2d ed. 1966). Section 205 states that the defendant has the burden of
proof for entrapment, while from section 212 arises the inference that the bur-
den set out in section 205 is to raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt. But see B.
Wrma, CALIFORNIA CRIaiNAL PROCEDURE § 343 (1963); Note, Entrapment, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1344 (1960). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Pro-
posed Official Draft, 1962).
108 People v. Valverde, 246 Cal. App. 2d 318, 322, 54 Cal. Rptr. 528, 530-
31 (1966).
109 Id. at 322-24, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 531-32.
110 Id. at 322, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 530-31.
111 People v. McGill, 10 Cal. App. 2d 155, 159-60, 51 P.2d 433, 435 (1935).
In Valverde the court said the defendant had the "burden of persuasion" on
the issue of entrapment, that is, "the burden of making the trier of the fact
believe the facts asserted by a party." 246 Cal. App. 2d at 321, 54 Cal. Rptr.
at 530. The burden of proving the fact is the burden referred to in section
115 of the Evidence Code. In terms of the quantum of evidence required by
section 115, the "'burden of proof' refers to the burden of proving the fact in
question by a preponderance of the evidence .... " CAL. EVIDENCE CODE §
115, Law Revision Comm'n Comment. See generally C. McCoRMvcx, Evi-
DENCE § 307 (1954).
112 E.g., People v. Cavanaugh, 44 Cal. 2d 252, 262, 282 P.2d 53, 59 (1955).
113 E.g., People v. Megladdery, 40 Cal. App. 2d 748, 766, 106 P.2d 84, 94
(1940).
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state to toll the statute of limitations'1 4 need only be shown by a
preponderance. The defendant must prove insanity by a prepon-
derance in order to overcome the presumption of sanity.115 Also,
when the defendant contends that some of the prosecution's evidence
was obtained by illegal search and seizure, he must overcome the
presumption of legality 1 6 by a preponderance. 117 The difference
between the two quanta, reasonable doubt and preponderance,
and the issues to which they apply is clearly stated in People v.
McGill: 118
[I]n a criminal action the burden is placed upon the people to estab-
lish beyond a reasonable doubt the "guilt" only of the defendant
therein; which leaves issues which do not particularly relate to his
guilt "to be made according to the preponderance of the evidence.""u 9
The holding in Valverde that entrapment requires a preponder-
ance of the evidence is a logical extension of the "police conduct"
theory developed in Benford, since under that theory entrapment
does not go to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Thus,
Valverde is only as sound as the theoretical justification of Benford.
If entrapment is recognized as diminishing the defendant's culpabil-
ity, as this comment has suggested, it would follow that the quantum
of proof necessary to sustain the burden is controlled by section 1096
of the Penal Code. The defendant then would only have to introduce
evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of entrapment, because
this would raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt.
Entrapment as a Question of Fact
Once the trial court determines that the defendant has success-
fully carried out his burden of introducing evidence, the existence
or nonexistence of entrapment becomes a question of fact for the
trier of fact 20 that is, the jury, or the court if a jury trial has been
waived. The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight and worth
of the evidence,' 2 ' and makes the final determination of the issue of
entrapment. 2 2
114 E.g., People v. McGill, 10 Cal. App. 2d 155, 159-60, 51 P.2d 433, 435
(1935).
115 People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal. 2d 876, 898, 256 P.2d 911, 925 (1953);
People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470, 477, 268 P. 909, 912 (1928).
116 See Badillo v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 269, 272, 294 P.2d 23, 25
(1956); People v. Carswell, 149 Cal. App. 2d 395, 399-400, 308 P.2d 852, 854-
55 (1957).
117 The defendant must overcome the presumption of legality by present-
ing a prima facie case of illegality. Badillo v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 269,
272, 294 P.2d 23, 25 (1956); People v. Wozniak, 235 Cal. App. 2d 243, 250, 45
Cal. Rptr. 222, 227 (1965); People v. Johnson, 195 Cal. App. 2d 573, 574-75,
16 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2-3 (1961).
I's 10 Cal. App. 2d 155, 51 P.2d 433 (1935).
1ll Id. at 160, 51 P.2d at 435.
120 E.g., People v. Austin, 198 Cal. App. 2d 186, 189, 17 Cal. Rptr. 782, 784
(1961).
121 E.g., People v. Gutierrez, 128 Cal. App. 2d 387, 390, 275 P.2d 65, 66
(1954).
122 See, e.g., People v. Hawkins, 210 Cal. App. 2d 669, 672, 27 Cal. Rptr.
144, 146 (1962).
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This California rule allowing the jury to make the final determi-
nation on the issue of entrapment does not seem consistent with the
theory of Benford. Under Benford the legal justification for the
defense is that it is a necessary means for the court to carry out its
duty of setting proper standards for law enforcement. If it is the
duty of the court to set proper law enforcement standards, and if
the only purpose of the defense of entrapment is to establish such
standards, then the court and not the jury should make the final
determination of the existence or nonexistence of entrapment. When
courts establish proper standards governing matters such as evidence
obtained by illegal search and seizure and confessions obtained during
illegal confinement, the courts and not the jury determine the fact
of an illegal search and seizure or an unlawful confinement. 123 In-
deed, allowing the jury to determine the issue in this situation
makes the jury, and not the court, the arbiter of proper standards
of law enforcement. The federal justices in both Sorrells and Sher-
man who supported the "police conduct" theory recognized the
problem of submitting the issue on entrapment to the jury, and
stressed that the issue should be determined by the court.124
It is not the position of this comment that the issue of entrap-
ment should not be submitted to the jury. Rather, the point is
raised to show that the procedure is inconsistent with the "police
conduct" theory adopted by the California Supreme Court in Benford.
Entrapment as a Question of Law
There are two situations in which the issue of entrapment is a
matter to be determined by the court and not the jury. The first,
which has already been discussed, is where the defendant fails to
introduce sufficient evidence to meet his burden of proof. The sec-
ond is where the evidence establishes entrapment as a matter of
law. In this second situation the judge would apparently have a duty
to direct a verdict of acquittal. California courts have recognized
that entrapment may be established as a matter of law,12 and have
made it clear that the defense is not established as a matter of law
where there is any substantial evidence from which the jury could
reasonably infer that no entrapment had taken place.126 When the
issue on appeal involves this question the appellate court's inquiry is
whether the prosecution's evidence, as a matter of law, shows entrap-
123 See, e.g., Steele v. United States No. 2, 267 U.S. 505, 511 (1925); People
v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 780, 291 P.2d 469, 471 (1955). See also UNIroRM RuLE
OF EVIDENCE 8.
124 "Equally important is the consideration that a jury verdict, although
it may settle the issue of entrapment in the particular case, cannot give sig-
nificant guidance for official conduct for the future. Only the court, through
the gradual evolution of explicit standards in accumulated precedents, can do
this with the degree of certainty that the wise administration of justice de-
mands." Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 385 (1958) (concurring
opinion, Frankfurter, J.); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 458 (1932)
(concurring opinion).
125 See, e.g., People v. Sweeney, 55 Cal. 2d 27, 49, 357 P.2d 1049, 1062, 9
Cal. Rptr. 793, 806 (1960).
126 E.g., People v. John, 191 Cal. App. 2d 313, 316, 12 Cal. Rptr. 696, 697
(1961).
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ment.127  These requirements make it very unlikely that entrapment
will ever be found as a matter of law unless the trial court does so,
and indeed no appellate cases appear where the court has ruled that
the evidence showed entrapment as a matter of law.1 28
When is Entrapment an Appealable Issue?
One question which appears to be in a somewhat confused state
in California involves the point at which the defendant makes en-
trapment an issue which must be submitted to and decided by the
jury to avoid reversal on appeal. Does the defendant make entrap-
ment an appealable issue as soon as he introduces sufficient evidence
to meet his burden of proof, or must he also request an instruction
on the defense?
Normally the defendant requests an instruction on entrapment
following the presentation of the evidence. The judge then deter-
mines whether the defendant has brought forth sufficient evidence,
and instructs or refuses to instruct accordingly.129  The refusal to
instruct is a basis for appeal. 30  A problem arises, however, when
the defendant introduces sufficient evidence yet fails to request an
instruction on entrapment.' 3 '
A California appellate court in a 1962 case indicated that entrap-
ment only becomes an issue after an offer of instruction is made, and
failure to make such a request means that there is no basis for ap-
peal. 132 Yet the California Supreme Court in 1954 stated that when
sufficient evidence has been introduced the trial court may instruct
on entrapment although neither party so requests; 33 and in 1965
the supreme court indicated that the trial judge has a duty to
instruct even if it is on his own motion. 34 Although this statement
was not a holding of the case,' 35 it was clear that entrapment would
be an issue on retrial and the supreme court was advising the trial
court on how to handle the question.8 6 Hence, it appears that in
California the defendant makes entrapment an issue as soon as he
introduces sufficient evidence to meet his burden of proof, and a
basis for appeal will lie from the court's failure to instruct whether
or not the defendant has made a request for an instruction. In
127 E.g., People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 12, 345 P.2d 928, 936 (1959);
People v. Estrada, 211 Cal. App. 2d 722, 727-28, 27 Cal. Rptr. 605, 608 (1963).
128 But see People v. Sweeney, 55 Cal. 2d 27, 53, 357 P.2d 1049, 1064, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 793, 808 (1960) (dissenting opinion); People v. Braddock, 41 Cal. 2d
794, 813, 264 P.2d 521, 532 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
129 See, e.g., People v. Evans, 134 Cal. App. 2d 733, 736-37, 286 P.2d 368,
369 (1955). See also People v. Chenault, 74 Cal. App. 2d 487, 498, 169 P.2d 29,
36 (1946).
130 See, e.g,, People v. Goree, 240 Cal. App. 2d 304, 305, 49 Cal. Rptr. 392
(1966).
131 See, e.g., People v. Hawkins, 210 Cal. App. 2d 669, 671-72, 27 Cal. Rptr.
144, 146 (1962).
132 Id.
'33 People v. Jackson, 42 Cal. 2d 540, 547, 268 P.2d 6, 10-11 (1954).
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any event, it is settled that the defense of entrapment is to be pre-
sented in the trial court,137 and it cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal' 38 or on a motion for a new trial.139 If the defendant
succeeds in having his case reversed and remanded for retrial on
other grounds, however, he may raise the defense of entrapment for
the first time at the new trial.140
Origin of Intent Test
Once the accused has raised the issue of entrapment by the
introduction of sufficient evidence, the trier of fact makes a deter-
mination of the existence or nonexistence of entrapment by using an
"origin of intent" test141 similar to the test employed in the federal
courts.142 Under this test the jury must determine whether the in-
tent to commit the crime originated in the mind of the officer or
informer, or in the mind of the defendant.143  If the evidence shows
that the criminal intent originated in the mind of the police officer or
informer, and that he lured a person into committing a criminal act
not otherwise contemplated by that person, then entrapment is a
successful defense.144 On the other hand, if the evidence shows that
the defendant already had the intent to commit the crime at the
time he was induced by the police, then it is said that the police
merely afforded him the opportunity to commit the offense 145 and
no amount of trickery or fraud on the part of the police will con-
stitute entrapment. 4
6
Under the origin of intent test, the evidence must first show
that the police conduct itself fell below certain standards before en-
trapment can be found. The fact that the defendant committed a
crime after being solicited to do so by a police officer or informer
raises no inference of unlawful entrapment. 147  There must be evi-
dence of persuasion, deceitful representation, inducement or allure-
ment on the part of the officer or informer, or the defense fails. 148
137 E.g., People v. Hawkins, 210 Cal. App. 2d 669, 671-72, 27 Cal. Rptr. 144,
146 (1962); People v. Ryan, 103 Cal. App. 2d 904, 909, 230 P.2d 359, 362 (1951).
138 People v. Tostado, 217 Cal. App. 2d 713, 719, 32 Cal. Rptr. 178, 182
(1963); People v. Griffin, 209 Cal. App. 2d 557, 563, 26 Cal. Rptr. 311, 314
(1962).
'39 People v. Polsalski, 181 Cal. App. 2d 795, 800, 5 Cal. Rptr. 762, 765-66
(1960).
140 People v. Perez, 62 Cal. 2d 769, 775, 401 P.2d 934, 937, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326,
329 (1965).
141 See People v. Jackson, 42 Cal. 2d 540, 547, 268 P.2d 6, 11 (1954); Peo-
ple v. Cordero, 240 Cal. App. 2d 826, 829, 49 Cal. Rptr. 924, 926 (1966).
142 See United States v. Head, 353 F.2d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 1965).
143 See, e.g., People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 10, 345 P.2d 928, 934 (1959).
144 See, e.g., People v. Grosofsky, 73 Cal. App. 2d 15i 18, 165 P.2d 757, 759
(1946) (dictum).
145 See, e.g., People v. Moraga, 244 Cal. App. 2d 565, 568, 53 Cal. Rptr. 563,
565 (1966).
146 See, e.g., People v. Ollado, 246 Cal. App. 2d 608, 615, 55 Cal. Rptr. 122,
126 (1966).
147 E.g., People v. Jalifi, 139 Cal. App. 2d 368, 371, 293 P.2d 878, 880 (1956).
148 See, e.g., People v. Marsden, 234 Cal. App. 2d 796, 798, 44 Cal. Rptr.
728, 729-30 (1965); People v. Price, 172 Cal. App. 2d 776, 779, 342 P.2d 437, 439
(1959); People v, Evans, 134 Cal. App. 2d 733, 736, 280 P,2d 368, 369 (1955).
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In prosecutions for the sale of narcotics 49 the courts have held that
where the evidence shows no more persuasion on the part of the
officer or informer than is necessary for an ordinary sale, there can
be no entrapment. 50
If sufficient police persuasion is shown, the trier of fact still
must find that the defendant did not have a preexisting criminal
intent prior to his contact with the alleged entrapper.15' Unlike
the federal courts,5 2 the California courts do not allow the prose-
cution to introduce evidence of prior criminal convictions, commis-
sion of prior crimes, or general criminal reputation in order to
prove that the defendant had a preexisting criminal intent.' ° s In-
stead, the issue of origin of intent must be determined from other
relevant, but less prejudicial, evidence.
The California appellate courts apparently have found that a
reasonable determination of the issue can be made from evidence of
the details of the transaction itself. Any time the evidence shows
that the defendant first suggested the crime, the defense of entrap-
ment will not be available. 5 4  Evidence of the readiness with
which the defendant conmmitted the criminal act is said to be indica-
tive of the origin of intent.155 If the accused readily responded to a
solicitation of the crime, the probabilities of a preexisting criminal
intent on his part are increased. A recent California case 56 has
made it clear, however, that readiness, or "hair-trigger susceptibil-
ity,"'u  to suggestion of crime will not negate the defense of en-
trapment as a matter of law.15 Other evidence may indicate that
the act was still an isolated incident not intended or designed by
the defendant until induced by the police. 159
Some California courts have indicated that the jury will be es-
pecially warranted in finding that the defendant had a preexisting
149 See generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11501 (narcotics other
than marijuana), § 11531 (sale of marijuana), § 11532 (sale of marijuana to
minors).
150 E.g., People v. Moraga, 244 Cal. App. 2d 565, 568, 53 Cal. Rptr. 563, 565
(1966); People v. Richardson, 152 Cal. App. 2d 310, 318, 313 P.2d 651, 656
(1957).
151 See, e.g., People v. Estrada, 211 Cal. App. 2d 722, 726, 27 Cal. Rptr. 605,
607 (1963).
152 See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 375 (1958).
153 People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 11, 345 P.2d 928, 935 (1959). But cf.
People v. Marshall, 226 Cal. App. 2d 243, 245, 37 Cal. Rptr. 887, 888 (1964),
where the court held that the rule barring inquiry into prior convictions,
criminal activities, and criminal reputation will not prevent introduction of
evidence on those matters if admissible upon grounds unrelated to entrap-
ment. See also People v. Estrada, 211 Cal. App. 2d 722, 727, 27 Cal. Rptr. 605,
608 (1963) where the court held that the rule barring inquiry into prior con-
victions, prior criminal activities, and criminal reputation is advantageous to
the defendant, and does not deny him due process of the law.
154 See, e.g., People v. Sweeney, 55 Cal. 2d 27, 50, 357 P.2d 1049, 1062-63,
9 Cal. Rptr. 793, 806-07 (1960).
155 See, e.g., People v. Harris, 210 Cal. App. 2d 613, 616, 26 Cal. Rptr. 850,
852 (1962).
150 People v. Goree, 240 Cal. App. 2d 304, 49 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1966).
157 Id. at 310, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
158 Id. at 310-11, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
159 See id. at 310, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 395-96.
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criminal intent where the offense charged is of the type to be habitu-
ally committed. 160 No court has exactly defined a habitually com-
mitted crime, but it is evident that the courts feel that the offense
of selling or furnishing narcotics falls within the category.161 One
court has explained that this offense is a habitually committed crime
because it "is often conducted as a trade and persons engage in it on
a more or less regular basis."'1 62 If the offense charged is of the type
to be habitually committed, the probabilities are increased over the
average crime that the defendant was already engaged in the crimi-
nal activity and had a preexisting intent to commit the crime if af-
forded the opportunity.163
Other evidence which the appellate courts have deemed relevant
to the issue of origin of intent includes familiarity with the par-
ticular criminal activity, 6 4 possession of a large supply of the illegal
contraband prior to any police inducement,165 ready access to the
contraband,166 and the ability to produce a large amount of the illegal
material in a short time.167 Furthermore, the defendant's own tes-
timony and extrajudicial admissions which shed light on any mat-
ter relevant to the origin of intent may be used in determining the
issue,168 whether similar evidence obtained from other sources would
be admissible or not.'6 9 Finally, any evidence relevant to the issue
of origin of intent but inadmissible by some rule of evidence, may be
used in making a determination of the issue if the party to which
the evidence is harmful fails to make timely objection to its admis-
sion.170
160 Compare People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 11, 345 P.2d 928, 935 (1959),
with People v. Neal, 120 Cal. App. 2d 329, 332, 261 P.2d 13, 15 (1953).
161 See, e.g., People v. Goree, 240 Cal. App. 2d 304, 305, 308, 49 Cal. Rptr.
392, 394 (1966); People v. Neal, 120 Cal. App. 2d 329, 330, 332, 261 P.2d 13, 15
(1953).
162 People v. Goree, 240 Cal. App. 2d 304, 308, 49 Cal. Rptr. 392, 394 (1966).
163 Id.
164 E.g., People v. Neal, 120 Cal. App. 2d 329, 333, 261 P.2d 13, 15 (1953).
Familiarity with the criminal activity has been inferred from the following
evidence: knowledge of the going prices of a narcotic, People v. Estrada, 211
Cal. App. 2d 722, 726-27, 27 Cal. Rptr. 605, 607 (1963); a concept of methods
of delivery that would protect the seller, id. at 726, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 607;
knowledge of sources of supply, People v. Moreno, 237 Cal. App. 2d 602, 606,
47 Cal. Rptr. 287, 289 (1965); intricate methods of delivery, id.; needle marks
on the inner elbows, People v. Haggard, 181 Cal. App. 2d 38, 45, 4 Cal. Rptr.
898, 902 (1960).
165 See People v. Diaz, 206 Cal. App. 2d 651, 671, 24 Cal. Rptr. 367, 378
(1962).
166 See People v. Burnett, 204 Cal. App. 2d 453, 456, 22 Cal. Rptr. 320, 322-
23 (1962).
167 See People v. Neal, 120 Cal. App. 2d 329, 333, 261 P.2d 13, 15 (1953).
168 See, e.g., People v. Evans, 134 Cal. App. 2d 733, 737, 286 P.2d 368, 370
(1955).
169 E.g., People v. Chavez, 184 Cal. App. 2d 741, 744, 7 Cal. Rptr. 729, 731
(1960). The appellate court held that the trial court's failure to instruct the
jury not to consider on the issue of entrapment the defendant's testimony as
to his prior convictions was not error where this evidence of prior convictions
would have been inadmissible if the prosecution had attempted to introduce
it. Id.
170 People v. Monteverde, 236 Cal. App. 2d 630, 642, 46 Cal. Rptr. 206,
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The operation of the California origin of intent test to determine
entrapment seems to be a relatively fair and reasonable procedure,
especially when compared to the tests advocated by the United
States Supreme Court in Sorrells and Sherman. The federal "ma-
jority" test is similar to the California test, except that the prosecu-
tion in a federal case is allowed to rebut a claim of entrapment by
introducing evidence of prior convictions, suspicious activities, and
general criminal reputation to show that the defendant was "pre-
disposed" to commit the crime17 1 or that the police had "reasonable
cause" to believe he was engaged in crime.172 The prejudicial effect
of such evidence upon a defendant with a criminal record can
hardly be denied; and the practice of allowing the evidence to be
used has received severe criticism from numerous legal writers.
173
When the probative value of this sort of evidence is measured against
the resulting danger of prejudice, it is difficult to justify its use.
Also, under the federal "minority" test entrapment would be
determined solely by examination of the police conduct, without
any subjective consideration of the preexisting intent of the particular
defendant. 7 4 It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the limitation
upon evidence of intent could lead to undesirable situations. A de-
fendant might be regularly engaged in criminal activity, have a pre-
existing intent to commit the crime, and yet he could be acquitted
merely because he was suspicious during the transaction and had to
be coaxed by a high degree of police persuasion. Likewise, the fed-
eral "minority" test could lead to the conviction of a person who
actually had no preexisting intent to commit the crime, but was
peculiarly susceptible to criminal suggestion and complied with the
215 (1965). The appellate court pointed out that the jury could consider
evidence of defendant's good reputation for truth and veracity even though
the prosecution had not attacked his reputation, because the prosecution had
failed to object to the admission of the evidence. Id.
171 See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
172 See Trice v. United States, 211 F.2d 513, 516 (9th Cir. 1954).
173 E.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 458-59 (1932) (concurring
opinion, Roberts, J.); Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool
Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1108 (1951). "Appeals
to sympathy, friendship, the possibility of exorbitant gain [by the police]*
... can no more be tolerated when directed against a past offender than
against an ordinary law-abiding citizen. A contrary view runs afoul of
fundamental principles of equality under law, and would espouse the notion
that when dealing with the criminal classes anything goes. The possibility
that no matter what his past crimes and general disposition the defendant
might not have committed the particular crime unless confronted with in-
ordinate inducements, must not be ignored. Past crimes do not forever out-
law the criminal and open him to police practices, aimed at securing his
repeated conviction, from which the ordinary citizen is protected. The whole
ameliorative hopes of modern penology and prison administration strongly
counsel against such a view." Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383
(1958) (concurring opinion, Frankfurter, 3.).
174 According to this test, the defendant would be acquitted unless "in
holding out inducements they [the police] should act in such a manner as
is likely to induce to the commission of crime only [those persons already
engaged in criminal conduct and willing to commit further crimes] . . . and
not others who would normally avoid crime and through self-struggle resist
ordinary temptations." 356 U.S. at 384.
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solicitation after a relatively small amount of inducement.
The California origin of intent test avoids both of these major
drawbacks. It does not unnecessarily prejudice the defendant or
unduly burden the prosecution, while it furnishes the jury with a
means of making a relatively accurate determination on the issue of
entrapment.
Conclusion
The "police conduct" theory of entrapment adopted by California
in People v. Benford is not as sound as the opposing theory that an
entrapped defendant is not culpable enough to be subject to crimi-
nal punishment. 175 First, the "police conduct" theory is weak be-
cause its reasoning is circular, and ultimately must be reduced to a
conclusion that the defendant is not sufficiently blameworthy to
merit punishment. If he is sufficiently blameworthy, there is
nothing impermissible about the police conduct, and the defendant
should be punished for his crime. Second, the "police conduct"
theory is untenable because it does not appear to be within the ju-
dicial power to set proper standards for law enforcement by means of
acquitting guilty defendants. Also, even though the California
courts since Benford verbally follow the view that entrapment does
not relieve the defendant's guilt, they nevertheless appear to make the
defense available to those persons who are not sufficiently blame-
worthy to be punished and deny it to those who are.
Although the differing theories on the legal justification for
entrapment have been developed largely through case dicta and
would seem to have little practical effect upon the operation of the
defense so far as the defendant is concerned, this in fact is not so.
In California the "police conduct" theory has led to the establish-
ment of the defendant's burden of proof at a preponderance of the
evidence.176 If entrapment were recognized as going to the question
of guilt or innocence, then the issue would fall within the purview
of section 1096 of the California Penal Code and the defendant's
burden of proof would only be to raise a reasonable doubt. 77 Hence,
the defendant has to make out a much stronger case of entrapment
under the one theory than under the other.
Aside from being unsound, the "police conduct" theory is in-
consistent with an older California rule governing the operation of
the defense which has not been changed; that is, the rule which
makes entrapment an issue to be determined by the jury. 7 8 If the
only rationale for the defense is that it is a means of setting proper
standards for law enforcement and the duty to set such standards
belongs exclusively to the court, then the court and not the jury
should determine the issue. The fact that the court would be de-
termining questions of fact would not be unusual or unprecedented,
since courts determine questions of fact in issues such as illegal
search and seizure and confessions obtained during unlawful con-
175 See text accompanying notes 48-73 supra.
176 See text accompanying note 85 supra.
177 See text following note 119 supra.
178 See text accompanying notes 120-22 supra.
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finement. 17 9 On the other hand, there is little or no precedent for
allowing juries to set proper standards for law enforcement. Only
if entrapment is seen as going to the question of the defendant's
guilt or innocence, should the issue be determined by the jury.
The California "origin of intent" test appears to be a relatively
fair and reasonable way of determining the issue of entrapment, es-
pecially when compared to the federal "majority" and "minority"
tests. 8 0 The test prevents the defendant with a criminal record from
being unduly prejudiced, while it furnishes the trier of fact with a
reasonably accurate means of distinguishing between the otherwise
innocent person and the professional criminal. In this way it allows
the defense of entrapment to be used to strike a fair balance be-
tween individual rights and the interests of society.
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